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Abstract
We construct a Schumpeterian growth model of a common market
with following properties. Households can stay as workers or become
researchers at some cost. Workers are employed in production and
researchers in R&D. Workers are unionized. A larger common market
means a wider variety of products and more intensive goods market
competition. The main findings are as follows. If the common market
is able to carry out extensive labour market reforms, then it should
accept new members as long as this increases consumption per capita.
If no extensive reforms are feasible, then the common market should
respond to excessive union power by accepting new members, which
increases competition in the product market.
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1 Introduction
Economic integration is commonly known to intensify international competi-
tion and to increase the variety of products. Because it affects the position of
labour unions in wage bargaining, it may have growth and welfare effects that
so far have been neglected in the literature. To examine this, we construct a
model of a common market with growth and wage bargaining.
Labour unions and employer federations have two roles which are often
mixed in economic debates: (i) they bargain over wages and (ii) lobby the
government for a number of issues (e.g. pension schemes, hiring and firing
costs, restrictions on hours of work). To avoid confusion in this matter, this
study concentrates wholly on role (i) and assumes that labour unions and
employer federations try to increase their income through wage settlement.
Political lobbying is ignored here and the author considers it elsewhere.1
The relationship of labour unions and economic growth may significantly
depend on the production structure of the economy. Peretto (1998) examines
the growth effects of union bargaining power by a product-variety model. His
main result is that a fall in union power promotes R&D and growth through
a higher profit margin. Peretto however assumes that (i) labour is employed
only in production, (ii) final goods can be directly converted into R&D, (iii)
labour unions completely ignore the effect of their wages on productivity
through R&D, and (iv) union power is exogenous. We, on the contrary,
assume that labour is used both in production and R&D and unions take
into account also the effects through R&D. We also examine the case where
union power can be altered through a labour market reform.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) (in ch. 4), Aghion and Howitt (1998),
and Wa¨lde (1999) examine economic growth from the viewpoint of creative
destruction in which firms can step forward in the quality ladders of technol-
ogy by investment on R&D. We take a similar ’Schumpeterian’ approach,
but instead of a competitive labour market we introduce wage bargaining in
which unions and employers observe the effect of wages on both employment
and investment.
Expensive labour may give rise to a higher growth rate. Cahuc and
1Using a common agency framework, Palokangas (2003) considers unions and employers
as lobbies trying to influence the self-interested government.
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Michel (1996) (using an OLG model) and Agell and Lommerud (1997) (us-
ing an extensive game framework) show that a minimum wage may create an
incentive for workers to accumulate human capital. Palokangas (1996, 2000)
introduces wage bargaining into Romer’s (1990) product-variety model with
skilled and unskilled workers. He shows that higher union bargaining power
leads to higher wages for unskilled workers, higher unemployment for both
skilled and unskilled workers in production, a lower wage for skilled workers.
This decreases costs in R&D and promotes growth. All these models, how-
ever, ignore the uncertainty that is embodied in technological change. To
eliminate this shortcoming, we use here a model of creative destruction.
The author uses a model of creative destruction for problems of growth
and trade also in two other papers. Palokangas (2004a) examines the growth
and welfare effects of union power in a model where research firms learn from
each other. It shows that the international coordination of labour market pol-
icy raises the workers’ wages and promotes growth and welfare. Palokangas
(2004b) examines the growth and welfare effects of the expansion of common
markets when the labour markets are perfect but economies differ in the
productivity of R&D. It shows that a small economy with low incentives to
save do not growth at all, if left alone, but avoids stagnation if its R&D is
productive enough to join a common market with a positive growth rate. In
this study, we introduce labour unions into the production sector. We show
that union power affects the integration strategy of the common market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains
the institutional background of the model. The basic structures of the model
are presented in section 3. Section 4 considers a household’s consumption
and saving as a problem of stochastic dynamic programming. It results in
the savings and investment functions for the economies.2 Section 5 examines
wage bargaining and Section 6 the growth and welfare effects of integration.
2The study focuses entirely on the households’ stationary equilibrium in which the
allocation of resources is invariable across technologies, and ignores the behaviour of the
system during the transitional period before the equilibrium is reached. In this study, the
growth model is based on a Poisson process. This means that if the initial state is chosen
outside a stationary equilibrium, then the model would most likely generate cycles, which
are technically extremely difficult to cope with.
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2 The setting
There is a common market with a given number J of member economies.
Each economy contains a fixed amount of land and a fixed number of similar
households.3 Competitive firms in the common market produce the con-
sumption good from land and intermediate goods of all member economies.
Intermediate-good firms in the common market are subject to oligopolistic
competition. They form expectations on each other’s responses. Integration
increases competition among the intermediate-good firms.
All households are modelled as dynastic families which are risk avert-
ers and share identical preferences. The members of such a family can be
either workers, who are employed in production, or researchers, who are em-
ployed in R&D. Family-optimization considerations determine the evolution
of consumption expenditure over time, the allocation of savings across shares
in different firms, and the decision whether a family member becomes a re-
searcher or enters the labour force as a worker. A single family takes prices,
wages, profits, employment and aggregate labour supply as given. A single
firm’s technology is a random variable but the probability of its improvement
in one unit of time depends on its R&D.
The structure of economy j ∈ {1, ..., J} can be characterized as follows:
(i) One monopolist at a time produces the economy-specific intermediate
good by workers. Several firms do R&D by using researchers and fi-
nance their expenditure by issuing shares. As soon as any of these
completes a new innovation, it takes over the whole production of the
intermediate good and drives the old producer out of the market.
(ii) The households decide on their labour supply before entering the labour
market. They save in shares in research firms of their home economies.
(iii) The workers are unionized. The labour union can control the whole of
the intermediate good industry, including potential entrants, so that
the change of the incumbent producer does not affect the union’s bar-
gaining position. There is, however, a fixed number βj of (employed
3The purpose of this admittedly strong assumption is to allow us to make welfare
comparisons, which would be extremely problematic with heterogeneous households.
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or unemployed) workers who shall not or cannot take part in strikes.
In wage bargaining, the labour union maximizes the discounted value
of the flow of the workers’ wages and the employer federation the dis-
counted value of the flow of the employers’ profits.4 Government regula-
tions influence both the relative bargaining power of the parties (which
we denote αj) and the number βj of non-striking workers.
(iv) Direct subsidy to R&D is commonly non-feasible.5 Given this, the gov-
ernment regulates union power as a second-best policy.
The growth model is based on a Poisson process. We focus entirely on
the households’ stationary equilibrium in which the allocation of resources is
invariable across technologies, and ignore the behaviour of the system during
the transitional period before the equilibrium is reached. If the initial state
is chosen outside a stationary equilibrium, then the model would most likely
generate cycles, which are technically extremely difficult to cope with.
3 The model
(a) Consumption-good firms. Each economy possesses one unit of land.
There is one consumption good in the common market and its price is nor-
malized at unity. The representative consumption-good firm in the common
market makes its output C from the quantity ak of land and the quantity nk
4Some papers assume that the expected wage outside the firm is the union’s reference
point, but this is not quite in line with the microfoundations of the alternating offers
game. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) state (pp. 177, 185-6) that the the
reference income should not be identified with the outside option point. Rather, despite
the availability of these options, it remains appropriate to identify the reference income
with the income streams accruing to the parties in the course of the dispute. For example,
if the dispute involves a strike, these income streams are the employee’s income from
temporary work, union strike funds, and similar sources, while the employer’s income
might derive from temporary arrangements that keeps the business running.
5It is commonly suggested that in order to eliminate the externality due to R&D, the
government should directly subsidize R&D. In reality, however, R&D is mostly carried
out by research departments of companies that are also producing other goods, so that
the government cannot completely distinguish between inputs being used in R&D and
production. If R&D were subsidized, then it were in the interests of both employers and
labour unions to hide costs of production under R&D expenditure and share the subsidy.
For this discussion, see Palokangas (2000), chapter 8.
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of the intermediate goods throughout all economies k by technology
C =
{ J∑
k=1
B
1−1/θ
k
[
n
1−1/θ
k + δa
1−1/θ
k
]}θ/(θ−1)
,
(1)
where Bk is the productivity parameter in economy k, θ > 1 the constant
elasticity of substitution and δ > 0 a parameter. The firm maximizes its
profit taking rents Rk and the prices of intermediate goods, pk, throughout
all economies k as given. This yields equilibrium conditions ak = 1 and
pj =
∂C
∂nj
= B
1−1/θ
j
(C
nj
)1/θ
,
Rj
pj
=
∂C
∂aj
/
∂C
∂nj
= δ
(nj
aj
)1/θ
= δn
1/θ
j . (2)
(b) Intermediate-good firms. There is one firm at a time as the incumbent
producer of good j. It takes the productivity Bj as given and anticipates the
reaction of the producers of the other goods k 6= j by the function
C = Φ(nj, J) with φ(J)
.
=
nj
Φ
∂Φ
∂nj
< 1 and φ′ > 0,
and maximizes profit
pij
.
= pjnj − wjnj (3)
by its input nj, given the demand function in (2). Without potential com-
petition from new entrants, the profit-maximization condition is given by
wj = pj + nj
∂pj
∂nj
= pj +
pj
θ
(nj
Φ
∂Φ
∂nj
− 1
)
=
[
1 +
φ(J)− 1
θ
]
pj.
This yields the monopoly price pmj
.
= θwj/[θ+φ(J)−1]. Each new generation
of good j provides constant ε > 1 times as many services as the product of
the generation before it. If the previous incumbent, whose productivity is
1/ε times the productivity of the current incumbent, makes a positive profit
pij = (1/ε)pjnj − wjnj > 0 for the monopoly price pmj , then the current
incumbent sets pj = εwj to prevent the others from entering the market.
Hence, the firm applies the mark-up rule pmj = (J)wj with
(J)
.
= min
[
ε,
θ
θ + φ(J)− 1
]
> 1, ′ < 0 for  < ε.
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Noting this, (2) and (3), and assuming that the common market is large
enough (i.e. J big enough), we obtain the equilibrium conditions
pmj = (J)wj, 
′ < 0, wjnj = pjnj/ = C1/θB
1−1/θ
j n
1−1/θ
j /(J),
pij = [(J)− 1]wjnj, Rj/(wjnj) = Rj/(pjnj) = δ(J)n1/θ−1j . (4)
(c) Research firms. Because only researchers are used in R&D, investment
expenditure in economy j is equal to labour cost vjlj, where lj is the re-
searchers’ labour input and vj their wage. When a research firm in economy
j is successful, it uses its new technology to drive the old producer out and
starts producing good j itself. Its profits are then distributed among those
who had financed it. When R&D is not successful for a firm, there is no
profit and the ex post value of a share of the firm is zero.
Economy j is subject to technological change which is characterized by
a Poisson process qj as follows. During a short time interval dτ , there is
an innovation dqj = 1 with probability Λjdτ , and no innovation dqj = 0
with probability 1− Λjdτ , where Λj is the arrival rate of innovations in the
research process. We assume that the arrival rate Λj in in fixed proportion
λ to research input in the economy j, lj:
Λj = λlj. (5)
(d) Technological change. We denote the serial number of technology in
economy k by tk. The level of productivity in the production of intermediate
good k, Bk(tk), is determined by the currently most advanced technology
tk. The invention of a new technology raises tk by one and the level of
productivity Bk(tk) by ε > 1. This implies
Bk(tk) = Bk(0)ε
tk . (6)
Because the average growth rate is in fixed proportion (log ε) to the arrival
rate Λk = λlk and research input lk,
6 we can use research input lk as a proxy
of the growth rate of economy k.
(e) Employment and labour supply. Because each family can change its mem-
bers’ occupation from a worker to an researcher at some cost and the abilities
6For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
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of all individuals in economy j differ, there is a decreasing and convex trans-
formation function between the supply of workers, Nj, and the supply of
researchers, Lj, as:
Nj = N(Lj), N
′ < 0, N ′′ < 0. (7)
More and more workers must be transformed in order to create one more
research input. A worker’s expected wage is equal to the wage wj times the
likelihood of employment, nj/Nj:
wej
.
= (nj/Nj)wj, (8)
Because researchers are not unionized, they are always fully employed lj = Lj
and their expected wage is equal to the wage vj.
Because households must choose their combination (Lj, Nj) of labour sup-
ply before entering the labour market, this choice is based on the transfor-
mation function (7) and the expected wages (vj, w
e
j) which the household
takes as given. This equilibrium is found by maximizing expected income
vjLj +w
e
jNj = vjLj +w
e
jN(Lj) by Lj, which yields the first order condition
vj/w
e
j = −N ′(Lj). This condition, lj = Lj, (7) and (8) yield
− N
′(lj)
N(lj)
= − N
′(Lj)
N(Lj)
=
vj
wejNj
=
vj
wjnj
. (9)
4 Consumption and saving
Economy j contains a fixed number κ of similar households which consist
of both workers and researchers.7 The utility for household ` ∈ {1, ..., κ} in
economy j from an infinite stream of consumption beginning at time T is
Uj(Cj`, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
Cσj`e
−ρ(τ−T )dτ with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (10)
where τ is time, E the expectation operator, Cj` consumption, ρ the rate of
time preference and 1/(1− σ) is the constant rate of relative risk aversion.
When household ` has financed a successful R&D project, it acquires the
right to a certain share of profits the successful firm earns in the production
7See footnote 3.
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of final goods. Since the old producer is driven out of the market, all shares
held in it lose their value. Let sj` be the true profit share of household `
when the uncertainty of the outcome of the projects are taken into account.
Following Wa¨lde (1999), we assume that the change in this share, dsj`, is a
function of the increment dqj of a Poisson process qj as follows:
dsj` = (ij` − sj`)dqj with ij` .= Sj`/(vjlj), (11)
where Sj` is saving by household ` in economy j. When a household does
not invest in the upcoming vintage, its share holdings are reduced to zero in
the case of research success dqj = 1. If it invests, then the amount of share
holdings depends on its relative investment in the vintage.
Labour income in economy j is equal to wages paid in production and
R&D, wjnj+vjlj. The total income of household ` ∈ {1, ..., κ} in economy j,
Aj`, consists of an equal share 1/κ of labour income and rents wjnj+vjlj+Rj
and the share sj` of the profits of the intermediate-good firm, pij:
8
Aj`
.
= (vjlj + wjnj +Rj)/κ+ sj`pij. (12)
Because the price of the consumption good is normalized at unity, the budget
constraint of household ` in economy j is given by
Aj` = Cj` + Sj`, (13)
where Cj` is consumption and Sj` saving.
We denote the value of receiving a share sj` of the profits of the mo-
nopolists using current technology tj by Ω(sj`, tj), and the value of receiv-
ing a share ij` of the profits of the monopolists of the next generation by
Ω(ij`, tj + 1). Household ` maximizes its utility (10) subject to stochastic
process (11) and the budget constraint (13) by its saving Sj`, given wages
(wj, vj), profits pij, employment (nj, lj) and prices (pj, Rj). This maximiza-
tion leads to the Bellman equation9
ρΩ(sj`, tj) = max
Sj`
{
Cσj` + Λj[Ω(ij`, tj + 1)− Ω(sj`, tj)]
}
, (14)
8Because the consumption-good firms are subject to technology (1) with constant re-
turns to scale, in equilibrium they have no profits to be distributed to households.
9Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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where Cj` = Aj` − Sj` and Λj = λlj. The first order condition associated
with the Bellman equation (14) is given by
λlj
d
dSj`
[Ω(ij`, tj + 1)− Ω(sj`, tj)] = σCσ−1j` . (15)
We try the solution that consumption expenditure Cj` is a share
0 ≤ cj` ≤ 1 out of income Aj`, and the value function is of the form Ω =
(cj`Aj`)
σ/rj`, where the consumption-income ratio cj` and the (subjective)
interest rate rj` are independent of income Aj`. Inserting that solution into
(14) and (15), we obtain the following results for economy j (Appendix A).
First, every innovation that replaces technology tj by tj + 1 raises consump-
tion Cj and domestic output yj in economy j as follows:
Ctj+1/Ctj = y
tj+1
j /y
tj
j = ε
1−1/θ > 1. (16)
Second, workers’ employment nj is determined by the function
nj = n(lj, J),
∂n
∂J
< 0,
∂2n
∂J∂lj
=
1 + (2− 1/θ)δn1−1/θ
n+ δn2−1/θ
∂n
∂lj
∂n
∂J
. (17)
This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1 When research input lj is kept constant, economic integra-
tion (i.e. a bigger J) decreases workers’ employment nj.
Greater competition due to integration decreases the price for good j and
the employment of workers in the production of good j.
5 Wage bargaining
In each economy j, the workers’ wage wj is determined by bargaining between
a union representing workers in economy j and a federation representing
employers of these workers. We assume, for simplicity, that these both are
risk neutral and have the same rate of time preference % > 0. The union
controls the whole of the intermediate-good industry inclusive of the possible
entrants, but there is a fixed number βj of workers who cannot go on strike or
who are willing to work even during strikes. This means that the reference
9
income is zero for the union and pij|nj=βj for the federation.10 The union
attempts then to maximize the expected value Uj of the stream of workers’
wages wjnj, while the federation attempts to maximize the expected value
Fj of the stream of employers’ profits over the reference income, pij−pij|nj=βj .
Given the result (16) and the stochastic technological progress (see part (c)
in section 3), these targets take the form:11
Uj(lj, C) .= E
∫ ∞
0
e−%τwjnj dτ =
Bj(0)
1−1/θwjnj
B
1−1/θ
j [%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]
,
Fj(lj, C) .= E
∫ ∞
0
e−%τ [pij − pij|nj=βj ]dτ =
Bj(0)
1−1/θ[pij − pij|nj ]=βj
B
1−1/θ
j [%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]
. (18)
The union (federation) maximizes its welfare Uj (Fj) by workers’ wage wj,
taking world consumption C as given. Because there is one-to-one correspon-
dence from wj to lj through (17), wj can be replaced by lj as the instrument
of bargaining. The outcome of bargaining is then obtained through maxi-
mizing the Generalized Nash Product Uαjj F1−αjj , where constant αj ∈ (0, 1)
is relative union bargaining power, by lj, keeping C constant. Given this
maximization, research input is determined as (Appendix B):
lj = l(αj, βj, J) with ∂n/∂lj < 0, lim
αj→1
lj = lim
βj→0
lj, ∂l/∂αj > 0,
∂l
∂βj
< 0,
∂l
∂J
{
> 0 if αj is large enough or βj small enough,
< 0 otherwise.
(19)
These results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2 The increase in union power (i.e. a bigger αj or a smaller
βj) promotes R&D lj and growth in economy j. When the common market
takes new members (i.e. J increases) but its unions are strong enough, R&D
and growth will be at a higher level for all its members.
With higher union power, workers’ wage wj increases, but their employment
lj and expected wage w
e
j falls. With a lower relative expected wage for a
worker, more households choose to become researchers rather than workers.
10See footnote 4.
11For this, see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 61.
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A higher number of researchers promotes R&D and economic growth. Inte-
gration shift the demand for workers’ labour to the left (see proposition 1).
This (i) makes labour demand more inelastic, which increases the wage, but
on the other hand it (ii) decreases employment the more, the stronger the
union is. If the union is strong enough, then effect (ii) outweighs (i), work-
ers’ expected wage wej falls, more households choose to become researchers
rather than workers, and R&D increases. If the union is weak, then effect (i)
outweighs (ii), workers’ expected wage wej increases, more households choose
to become workers rather than researchers, and R&D decreases.
6 Social welfare
We define the level of productivity in the consumption-good sector as
B
.
=
[
1
J
J∑
k=1
B
1−1/θ
k
]θ/(θ−1)
.
(20)
Because there is symmetry throughout economies j = 1, .., J , there exists an
equilibrium with αj = α, βj = β, lj = l and Bj = B. In that equilibrium,
the average growth rate of consumption (= the arrival rate of jumps ε > 1
in the level of productivity in the consumption-good sector) is given by
Λ
.
=
∂B
∂Bk
Λk
∣∣∣∣
Bk=B
=
1
J
J∑
k=1
( B
Bk
)1/θ∣∣∣∣
Bk=B
Λk =
1
J
J∑
k=1
Λk.
We denote the serial number of consumption technology by t. Choosing
B(0) = 1, we then obtain B = εt. Noting this, ak = 1, (1), (17), (19) and
(20), we can define consumption per capita in the common market as follows:
C
Jκ
= ψ(l, J)
[
1
J
J∑
k=1
B
1−1/θ
k
]θ/(θ−1)
= ψ(l, J)B = εtψ(l, J),
ψ(l, J)
.
= J1/(θ−1)
[
n(l, J)1−1/θ + δ
]θ/(θ−1)
/κ, ∂ψ/∂l < 0,
1
ψ
∂ψ
∂J
=
1/J
θ − 1 +
1
n+ δn1/θ
∂n
∂J
. (21)
The utility (10) of a single consumer in the common market is then given by
Uj = E
∫ ∞
T
( C
Jκ
)
e−ρ(τ−T )dτ = E
∫ ∞
T
ψ(l, J)σεσte−ρ(τ−T )dτ. (22)
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Consider first the case where the common market is able to reform the
labour market. The social planner in the common market then maximizes
social welfare (22) by union power (α or β) and the size of the common
market, J . Because l depends on these parameters through (see (19)), the
number of researchers lj = l can be used as the instrument of maximization.
Denoting the value of the state of technology t for this government by Υ(t),
and noting (5) and (19), we obtain the Bellman equation for this policy as:
ρΥ(t, J) = max
J, l
Q(l, J, t), where Q .= ψ(l, J)σεσt + λl[Υ(t+ 1)−Υ(t)].
(23)
We define (J∗, l∗) = argmaxJ, lQ(l, J, t). This, (21) and (23) yield
J∗ = argmax
J
Q(l∗, J, t) = argmax
J
ψ(l∗, J) = argmax
J
[C/(Jκ)]l=l∗ .
This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 If the common market is free to make a labour market reform
of any size, then the expansion of the common market (i.e. the increase in J)
is welfare enhancing as long as it increases consumption per capita, C/(Jκ).
With the possibility of extensive labour market reforms, the common market
can control its growth rate through union power. In such a case, the inte-
gration of new members can be wholly determined by the maximization of
current consumption with no concern of economic growth.
Second, consider the case where the common market cannot make a
labour market reform that is large enough to attain the unconstrained social
optimum (J∗, l∗). We can then assume that the parameter of union power,
α and β, are exogenous. The Bellman equation for this policy is as follows:
ρΥ(t, J) = max
J
Q(l(α, β, J), J, t). (24)
We restrict ourselves to small departures from the social optimum ∂Q/∂l = 0,
for simplicity. Large departures would involve ambiguous results.
In the neighbourhood of ∂Q/∂l = 0, given (17), (19), and (23), we obtain
∂Q
∂J
= σ
Q
ψ
∂ψ
∂J
+
∂Q
∂l
∂l
∂J
= σQ
[
θ/J
θ − 1 +
1
n+ δn1/θ
∂n
∂J
]
for
∂Q
∂l
≈ 0,
12
∂2Q
∂J∂l
=
1
B
∂Q
∂J
∂Q
∂l
+ σQ
[
1
n+ δn1/θ
∂2n
∂J∂l
− 1 + δn
1/θ−1/θ
(n+ δn1/θ)2
∂n
∂J
∂n
∂l
]
=
1
B
∂Q
∂J
∂Q
∂l
+
σQ
n+ δn1/θ
[
1 + (2− 1/θ)δn1−1/θ
n+ δn2−1/θ
− 1 + δn
1/θ−1/θ
n+ δn1/θ
]
∂n
∂J
∂n
∂l
>
1
B
∂Q
∂J
∂Q
∂l
+
σQ
n+ δn1/θ
[
1
n
− 1 + δn
1/θ−1/θ
n+ δn1/θ
]
∂n
∂J
∂n
∂l
> 0 for
∂Q
∂l
≈ 0,
∂
∂J
(∂Q
∂l
∂l
∂α
)
=
∂2Q
∂l∂J
∂l
∂α
+
∂Q
∂l
∂2l
∂α∂J
> 0 for
∂Q
∂l
≈ 0,
∂
∂J
(∂Q
∂l
∂l
∂β
)
=
∂2Q
∂l∂J
∂l
∂α
+
∂Q
∂l
∂2l
∂α∂J
< 0 for
∂Q
∂l
≈ 0. (25)
The first-order and second-order conditions for J are then given by ∂Q/∂J =
0 and ∂2Q/∂J2 < 0. Differentiating ∂Q/∂J = 0 totally, and noting (25) and
∂2Q/∂J2 < 0, we obtain
dJ
dα
= − ∂
∂J
(∂Q
∂l
∂l
∂α
)/∂2Q
∂J2
> 0 and
dJ
dβ
= − ∂
∂J
(∂Q
∂l
∂l
∂β
)/∂2Q
∂J2
< 0
for ∂Q/∂l ≈ 0. This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 4 If the common market cannot make large enough labour
market reform, then its optimal size is the bigger, the stronger its labour
unions are (i.e. the bigger α or the smaller β). In other words, the common
market should outweigh excessive union power through economic integration,
which increases competition in the goods market.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines a common market with the following properties. First,
The expansion of the common market increases the variety of products and
the intensity of competition in the goods market. Second, growth is gener-
ated by creative destruction. A firm creating the latest technology through
a successful R&D project crowds the other firms with older technologies out
of the market so that they lose their value. Third, households save by buying
shares in R&D projects. Fourth, households decide whether their members
are researchers who are used inR&D, or workers who are employed in produc-
tion. A change of occupation involves a cost. Fifth, direct subsidy to R&D
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is commonly non-feasible. Sixth, wages are determined by union-employer
bargaining. The main findings are as follows.
Union power has a positive impact on the growth rate, but a negative
impact on current income. With higher union power, workers’ wages increase,
but their employment and expected wage falls, and more households choose to
become researchers rather than workers. With lower employment for workers,
current output and income is smaller. On the other hand, with a larger
number of researchers, there will be more innovations and a higher growth
rate in future. The welfare effect of union power is positive (negative) if the
latter effect through growth dominates (is dominated by) the former effect
through employment. Union power and the growth rate are socially optimal
when the growth and employment effects exactly outweigh each other.
When the common market takes new members, R&D and the growth
rate increase (decrease) if unions are strong (weak). The integration of new
members decreases the prices for goods and the demand for workers’ labour.
This (i) makes labour demand more inelastic, which increases the wage,
but on the other hand it (ii) decreases employment the more, the stronger
the union is. If unions are strong enough, then effect (ii) outweighs (i),
workers’ expected wage falls, more households choose to become researchers
rather than workers, and R&D increases. If unions are weak, then effect (i)
outweighs (ii), workers’ expected wage wej increases, more households choose
to become workers rather than researchers, and R&D decreases.
The decision on accepting new members should depend on the rigidity
of labour market institutions. With the possibility of extensive labour mar-
ket reforms, the common market can control its growth rate through union
power. In such a case, the integration of new members can be wholly de-
termined by the maximization of current consumption with no concern of
economic growth. In the absence of extensive reforms, the common market
should outweigh excessive union power through economic integration, which
increases competition in the goods market. This means that common mar-
kets with strong labour unions should have a lower threshold of taking in
new members than those with weak unions.
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Appendix A
Let us denote variables depending on technology tj by superscript tj.
Since according to (12) income A
tj
j` depends directly on the share s
tj
j`, we
denote A
tj
j`(s
tj
j`). Guessing that cj` is invariant across technologies, we obtain
C
tj
j` = cj`A
tj
j`(s
tj
j`), S
tj
j` = (1− cj`)Atjj`(stjj`). (26)
The share in the next producer tj + 1 is determined by investment under
technology tj, s
tj+1
j` = i
tj
j`. The value functions are then given by
Ω(s
tj
j`, tj) = (C
tj
j`)
σ/rj`, Ω(i
tj
j`, tj + 1) = (C
tj+1
j` )
σ/rj`. (27)
Given this, we obtain
∂Ω(s
tj
j`, tj)/∂S
tj
j` = 0. (28)
From (11), (12), (26) and (27) it follows that
∂i
tj
j`
∂S
tj
j`
=
1
v
tj
j l
tj
j
,
∂[A
tj+1
j` (i
tj
j`)]
∂i
tj
j`
=
∂[A
tj+1
j` (s
tj+1
j` )]
∂s
tj+1
j`
= pi
tj+1
j ,
∂Ω(i
tj
j`, tj + 1)
∂S
tj
j`
=
σ
rj`
(C
tj+1
j` )
σ−1 ∂C
tj+1
j`
∂A
tj+1
j`
∂A
tj+1
j`
∂i
tj
j`
∂i
tj
j`
∂S
tj
j`
= σ
cj`(C
tj+1
j` )
σ−1pitj+1j
rj`v
tj
j l
tj
j
.
(29)
We focus on a stationary equilibrium where the allocation of labour,
(l
tj
j , n
tj
j ), is invariant across technologies. Given (7), this implies
l
tj
j = lj, n
tj
j = nj, Nj = N(Lj) = N(lj). (30)
From (4), (6), (12), (26) and (30) it then follows that
C
tj+1
j` /C
tj
j` = A
tj+1
j` /A
tj
j` = v
tj+1
j /v
tj
j = pi
tj+1
j /pi
tj
j
= w
tj+1
j /w
tj
j = (B
tj+1
j /B
tj
j )
1−1/θ = ε1−1/θ > 1. (31)
Inserting (5), (27) and (31) into equation (14), we obtain
0 = (ρ+ Λj)Ω(s
tj
j`, tj)− (Ctjj`)σ − ΛjΩ(itjj`, tj + 1)
= (ρ+ Λj)(C
tj
j`)
σ/rj` − (Ctjj`)σ − Λj(Ctj+1j` )σ/rj
= (C
tj
j`)
σ[ρ+ Λj − rj` − ε(1−1/θ)σΛj]/rj`
= (C
tj
j`)
σ
{
ρ− rj` + [1− ε(1−1/θ)σ]λlj
}
/rj`.
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This leads to the function
rj = rj` = ρ+ [1− ε(1−1/θ)σ]λlj. (32)
From (4), (9), (17) and (34) it follows that
v
tj
j /(w
tj
j nj) = −N ′(lj)/N(lj). (33)
Inserting (4) and (28)-(33) into (15) yields
0 = λlj
∂Ω(i
tj
j`, tj + 1)
∂S
tj
j`
− σ(Ctjj`)σ−1 = λljσcj`
(C
tj+1
j` )
σ−1pitjj
rjv
tj
j lj
− σ(Ctjj`)σ−1
= σ(C
tj
j`)
σ−1
[
λcj`ε
(1−1/θ)(σ−1) pi
tj
j
rjv
tj
j
− 1
]
and
cj` = ε
(1/θ−1)(σ−1) rjv
tj
j
λpi
tj
j
= ε(1/θ−1)(σ−1)
ρ+ [1− ε(1−1/θ)σ]λlj
(− 1)λN(lj)/N ′(lj)
.
= c(lj), (34)
where the sign of c(lj) is ambiguous. Given
∑κ
`=1 s
tj
j` = 1, (4), (12), (26),
(33) and (34), we obtain vjlj =
∑κ
`=1 Sj` and
vjlj
1− c(lj) =
1
1− c(lj)
κ∑
`=1
Sj` =
κ∑
`=1
Sj`
1− cj` =
κ∑
`=1
Aj` = vjlj + wjnj +Rj + pij
= vjlj + wjnj +Rj,
vjlj = [1/c(lj)− 1](wjnj +Rj) = [1/c(lj)− 1]
(
1 + δn
1/θ−1
j
)
wjnj,
lj
1− 1/c(lj)
N ′(lj)
N(lj)
=
1
1/c(lj)− 1
vjlj
wjnj
= (J)
[
1 + δn
1/θ−1
j
]
. (35)
Equation (35) defines the function nj = n(lj, J). Keeping lj constant, we
obtain ∂n/∂b by differentiating the logarithm of the term (J)
[
1 + δn
1/θ−1
j
]
totally. This, ′ < 0 and θ > 1 yield
∂n
∂J
(lj, J) =
θ
θ − 1
[
δn(lj, J)
2−1/θ + n(lj, J)
]′(J)
(J)
< 0.
Differentiating the logarithm of this equation with respect to lj yields
∂2n
∂J∂lj
/
∂n
∂J
=
1 + (2− 1/θ)δn1−1/θ
n+ δn2−1/θ
∂n
∂lj
.
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Appendix B
Given (4), (17) and (18), the logarithm of the Generalized Nash product
Uαj F1−αj takes the form
Γj(lj, C, αj, βj, θ)
.
= αj log Uj + (1− αj) log Fj
= αj log
[
wjnjB
1/θ−1
j
]
+ (1− αj) log
[(
pij − pij|nj=βj
)
B
1/θ−1
j
]
+ (1− 1/θ) logBj(0)− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]
= αj log
[
wjnjB
1/θ−1
j
]
+ (1− αj)
[
log
(
1− pij|nj=βj/pij
)
+ log pijB
1/θ−1
j
]
+ (1− 1/θ) logBj(0)− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]
= log
[
wjnjB
1/θ−1
j
]
+ (1− αj) log
[
1− (βj/nj)1−1/θ] + (1− αj) log(− 1)
+ (1− 1/θ) logBj(0)− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]
= (1− 1/θ) log nj + (1− αj) log
[
1− β1−1/θj n1/θ−1j ] + (1− αj) log(− 1)
+ (1− 1/θ) logBj(0)− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]− log(J) + log[γµ(J)]
+ (1/θ) logC
= (1− 1/θ)αj log nj + (1− αj) log
[
n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj ] + (1− αj) log(− 1)
+ (1− 1/θ) logBj(0)− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]− log(J) + log[γµ(J)]
+ (1/θ) logC with %+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj > 0 and nj = n(lj, J). (36)
Because a logarithm is an increasing transformation, the outcome of bar-
gaining is obtained through maximizing the function (36) by lj, taking C as
given. This leads to the first-order condition
∂Γj
∂lj
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− 1
θ
) +︷ ︸︸ ︷[ αj
n(lj, J)
+
(1− αj)n(lj, J)−1/θ
n(lj, J)1−1/θ − β1−1/θj
]
∂n
∂lj
+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ε1−1/θ − 1)λ
%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj
=
(
1− 1
θ
) n(lj, J)1−1/θ − αjβ1−1/θj
n(lj, J)[n(lj, J)1−1/θ − β1−1/θj ]
∂n
∂lj
+
(ε1−1/θ − 1)λ
%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj = 0.
(37)
Note that if all workers are controlled by the union and able to strike, βj → 0,
then the outcome is the same as with a monopoly union α→ 1.
In equilibrium, there must be pij > pij|nj=βj and nj > βj. Noting αj < 1,
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θ > 1 and nj > βj, we show first that
nj
∂
∂nj
[
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
nj(n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj )
]/[
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
nj(n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj )
]
= nj
∂
∂nj
log
[
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
nj(n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj )
]
= nj
∂
∂nj
[
log
(
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
)− log(n1−1/θj − β1−1/θj )− log nj]
=
(
1− 1
θ
)
n
1−1/θ
j
[ 1
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
− 1
n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj
]
− 1
=
(1− 1/θ)(αj − 1)β1−1/θj n1−1/θj(
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
)(
n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj
) − 1. (38)
Noting this, ε > 1, (4), (17), (19), (37) and (38), we obtain ∂n/∂lj < 0 and
∂2Γj
∂lj∂αj
=
(1
θ
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
β
1−1/θ
j
n(lj, J)[n(lj, J)1−1/θ − β1−1/θj ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂n
∂lj︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
∂2Γj
∂lj∂βj
=
(
1− 1
θ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(1− αj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂n
∂lj︸︷︷︸
−
∂
∂βj
[
n(lj, J)
−1/θ
n(lj, J)1−1/θ − β1−1/θj
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
∂2Γj
∂lj∂J
=
(
1− 1
θ
){∂n
∂lj
∂
∂nj
[
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
nj(n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj )
]
∂n
∂J
+
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
nj(n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj )
∂2n
∂lj∂J
}
=
(
1− 1
θ
)∂n
∂lj
∂n
∂J
{
∂
∂nj
[
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
nj(n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj )
]
+
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
nj(n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj )
1 + (2− 1/θ)δn1−1/θj
nj + δn
2−1/θ
j
}
=
(
1− 1
θ
)∂n
∂lj
∂n
∂J
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
n2j(n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj ){
(1− 1/θ)(αj − 1)β1−1/θj n1−1/θj(
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
)(
n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj
) − 1 + 1 + (2− 1/θ)δn1−1/θj
1 + δn
1−1/θ
j
}
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=+︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− 1
θ
)2 −︷︸︸︷∂n
∂lj
−︷︸︸︷
∂n
∂J
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
n2j(n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj )
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
n
1−1/θ
j{
(αj − 1)β1−1/θj(
n
1−1/θ
j − αjβ1−1/θj
)(
n
1−1/θ
j − β1−1/θj
) + 1
1 + δn
1−1/θ
j
}
{
> 0 if αj is large enough or βj small enough,
< 0 otherwise.
Given these inequalities, (17), ∂n/∂lj < 0 and the second-order condition
∂2Γj/∂l
2
j < 0, the comparative statics of the equation (37) produces the
function lj = l(αj, βj, J) with the properties
∂lj
∂αj
= − ∂
2Γj
∂lj∂αj
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
> 0,
∂lj
∂βj
= − ∂
2Γj
∂lj∂βj
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
< 0,
∂lj
∂J
= − ∂
2Γj
∂lj∂J
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
{
> 0 if αj is large enough or βj small enough,
< 0 otherwise.
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